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INTRODUCTION
After enrolling in the Illinois Medicaid program, the public health
insurance program for poor and disabled Americans, Tessinia Rodriguez and Elissa Bassler both sought a physician referral from the
Medicaid hotline.1 The hotline gave Rodriguez the names of approx-
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imately ten doctors, all of whom practiced more than thirty miles
from her home; not one accepted Medicaid.2 Bassler received the
names of eight doctors, none of whom accepted Medicaid.3 Benita
Branch had difficulty finding a doctor to treat her children on Medicaid, and when she finally did, the doctor did not schedule appointments.4 Branch had to bring her children into the doctor’s office and
take a number, often waiting more than an hour—and sometimes
several hours—before being seen.5 Sara Mauk was able to find a doctor that would see her daughter; however, the doctor required Medicaid patients to wait until after all privately insured patients had been
seen.6
Over sixty million low-income individuals rely on Medicaid for
their health insurance coverage.7 The majority of Medicaid beneficiaries are parents and children.8 The most medically needy and costly are the elderly and disabled.9 For both groups, however, Medicaid
is intended to be a lifeline to essential health and medical care.10 Although Medicaid patients have freedom of choice to select among par-

1. Memisovski ex rel. Memisovski v. Maram, No. 92-C-1982, 2004 WL 1878332,
at *18–19 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2004) (finding that the children in Cook County, Illinois
were unable to secure Medicaid covered care, in part because of low reimbursement
rates).
2. Id. at *18.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at *19.
7. See MEDICAID AND CHIP PAYMENT AND ACCESS COMMISSION (MACPAC),
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON MEDICAID AND CHIP 26 (2011) [hereinafter
MACPAC REPORT], (noting that today, the Medicaid program “finances health coverage for an estimated 68 million people, about half of whom are children”). In 2009,
Congress created the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission
(MACPAC) specifically to study and make recommendations on beneficiary access
to care in Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). See 42
U.S.C. § 1396 (2006).
8. See MACPAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 29.
9. Id. at 30. Disabled individuals and individuals age sixty-five and older make
up less than one-third of the Medicaid population, yet account for about two-thirds of
Medicaid spending. Id.
10. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doctors: Interpreting the
“Equal Access” Provision, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 673, 675 (2006) (citing Medicare and
Medicaid, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 91st Cong. 57 (1970)
(statement of Honorable John G. Veneman, Under Secretary, Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare) [hereinafter Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doctors] (testifying that providing “mainstream medical care for all the people of this
country” was “[t]he whole purpose of the 1965 act”)).

BIENSTOCK_CHRISTENSEN

2012]

7/11/2012 8:21 AM

STATE MEDICAID PAYMENT POLICIES

807

ticipating providers,11 physicians also have freedom of choice to participate in Medicaid.12 Congress has recognized that “without adequate payment levels, it is simply unrealistic to expect physicians to
participate in the [Medicaid] program.”13 In fact, low reimbursement
rates have led many physicians and particularly specialists to stop
treating Medicaid patients.14
Despite the well-established correlation between Medicaid provider payments and physicians’ willingness to treat Medicaid recipients,
states continue to make budget-driven cuts to their Medicaid provider
reimbursement rates.15 Although the economy is improving slowly,
states still face a dire fiscal situation and growing Medicaid costs are a
key contributor to state budget gaps.16 As a result, nearly every state
has proposed or implemented cuts to Medicaid in their 2011–2012
budget year, reducing payments to doctors, hospitals and other health
care providers that treat Medicaid patients.17 As the stories of

11. The Medicaid Act’s “freedom of choice” provision requires states to ensure
that “any individual eligible for medical assistance . . . may obtain such assistance
from any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform
the service or services required . . . who undertakes to provide him such services . . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (2006).
12. See BARRY R. FURROW, ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION
AND FINANCE 562 (3d ed. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)).
13. OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1989, H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at
390 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2116.
14. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-624, MEDICAID AND CHIP:
MOST PHYSICIANS SERVE CHILDREN BUT HAVE DIFFICULTY REFERRING THEM FOR
SPECIALTY CARE 18 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11624.pdf. GAO estimates that for providers who choose not to participate in Medicaid and CHIP, 95%
are influenced by low provider reimbursement rates. Id.
15. Public scientific studies consistently confirm that access to health care and
dental services is generally poor for Medicaid recipients when compared to access
enjoyed by the privately insured population, whose provider reimbursement rates are
notably higher. See, e.g., Joanna Bisgaier et al., Disparities in Child Access to Emergency Care for Acute Oral Injury, 127 PEDIATRICS 1428 (2011); Joanna Bisgaier &
Karin V. Rhodes, Auditing Access to Specialty Care for Children with Public Insurance, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2324 (2011); Medical Access Study Group, Access of
Medicaid Recipients to Outpatient Care, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1426 (1994); Asheley
C. Skinner & Michelle L. Mayer, Effects of Insurance Status on Children’s Access to
Specialty Care: A Systemic Review of the Literature, 7 BMC HEALTH SERV. RES. 194
(2007).
16. See NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS,
FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES: AN UPDATE OF STATE FISCAL CONDITIONS 28 (2011), http
://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/FSS1111.PDF.
17. See VERNON K. SMITH ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MOVING AHEAD AMID FISCAL CHALLENGES: A LOOK AT MEDICAID SPENDING, COVERAGE AND POLICY TRENDS 7 (2011), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/
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Tessinia Rodriguez, Elissa Bassler, Benita Branch, and Sara Mauk
exemplify, cuts to state Medicaid programs can make it difficult, and
sometimes impossible, for Medicaid patients to find a doctor who will
see them.18 Cuts in reimbursement rates for providers can and have
resulted in dramatic consequences for Medicaid patients.19 For example, in a highly publicized case, a hospital in Clare, Michigan
closed its obstetrical unit in direct response to the state’s inadequate
Medicaid payments.20
Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 to ensure that poor and disabled Americans had access to “mainstream” and often life-saving
medical services.21 The goal was to provide beneficiaries with meaningful access to medical services, not merely a Medicaid card.22 Title
XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (Medicaid Act) gives
individuals who meet Medicaid eligibility requirements a legal right
to have payments made to their providers for their needed medical
services.23 The federal government and states jointly fund services
rendered to Medicaid-eligible individuals.24 States receive federal

8248.pdf. A total of thirty-nine states restricted provider rates in FY 2011 and fortysix states reported plans to do so in FY 2012. Id.
18. See Moncrieff, supra note 10, at 674 (noting that although cutting providers’
reimbursements may seem like the best option, it causes providers to refuse Medicaid
patients, “leaving program recipients with a welfare entitlement that buys them nothing”); see also Memisovski ex rel. Memisovski v. Maram, No. 92-C-1982, 2004 WL
1878332, at *43 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2004) (finding that “the rates Illinois Medicaid
pays simply do not entice medical providers to participate in Medicaid”).
19. See Shannon McCaffrey, State Medicaid Cuts Hit Patients, Doctors, FISCAL
TIMES (Dec. 27, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2011/12/27/AP-Medi
caid-Cuts-Hit-Patients-Doctors.aspx#page1 (noting that Arizona, for a time, eliminated life-saving transplants for Medicaid patients, and hospital officials in the state
blame at least one death on the halt in coverage); see also Robert Pear, As Number
of Medicaid Patients Goes Up, Their Benefits Are About To Drop, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 2011, at A24.
20. See Kevin Sack, As Medicaid Payments Shrink, Patients are Abandoned, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2010, at A1.
21. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
22. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-213, at 66 (1965) (noting that Congress’ purpose in establishing the Medicaid program was to provide comprehensive health benefits to
“the most needy in the country”).
23. See ELICIA J. HERZ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (CRS) 7-5700,
MEDICAID: A PRIMER 1–4 (2012) (listing who must receive Medicaid services from
the state).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2006); see 42 C.F.R. § 430 (2011) (explaining that Medicaid
is jointly funded by the states and federal government and administered by the
states).
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matching payments for all state spending on covered services.25 To
receive federal payments, however, states must implement their Medicaid programs consistent with minimum federal requirements.26 For
example, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) requires states to adopt payment rates that “are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care
and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that
such care and services are available to the general population in the
geographic area.”27 This provision is often referred to as the “equal
access provision.”28 Today, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS), a subdivision of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), is charged with the administration of the Medicaid program at the federal level.29 CMS oversees
state Medicaid programs to ensure that they comply with the minimum federal requirements promulgated under the Medicaid Act, including the equal access provision.30
This Note discusses Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to health care in
the context of the federal Medicaid Act’s equal access provision.31
After examining state Medicaid payment policies and legal challenges
to state rate cuts specifically, this Note finds that states have failed to
comply with and the federal government has failed to enforce the
equal access provision of the Medicaid Act.32 This Note concludes
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2006) (defining services that qualify as “medical assistance” and therefore receive funding).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006). State participation in the program is voluntary, but
states that choose to participate must comply with the provisions of the Medicaid Act
and its implementing regulations, 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.0–456.725, which set the program’s parameters and establish its basic requirements. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 301 (1980).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) additionally requires that a state provide “methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the payment for, care and services available under the plan . . . as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care and services and to assure that payments are consistent
with efficiency, economy, and quality of care.”
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
29. MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, THE LAW OF
HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND REGULATION 186 (2004); see CMS,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
30. See HALL, supra note 29, at 186.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
32. Although this Note brings to light many of the shortfalls of the Medicaid program, it is not intended to suggest that Medicaid has not been extremely beneficial.
In fact, shortcomings aside, Medicaid has provided health insurance to millions of
low-income Americans and markedly improved the position of the poor in the American health care system. See, e.g., JONATHAN ENGEL, POOR PEOPLE’S MEDICINE:
MEDICAID AND AMERICAN CHARITY CARE SINCE 1965 xvii (2006) (“Medicaid, although imperfect, has eased access, provided prophylaxis, and delivered procedures.
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with policy recommendations that will enhance CMS’ oversight of
states’ payment policies, thereby ensuring that Medicaid beneficiaries
have access to meaningful care, as required by the Medicaid Act.
Part I of this Note reviews the history and structure of Medicaid
and describes the Medicaid provider payment system in the context of
the requirements, history, and rationale of the equal access provision
of the Medicaid Act. Part II analyzes administrative tools available to
CMS to ensure state compliance with the equal access process, highlighting the limitations of the administrative system. Part III proposes alternative administrative mechanisms by which CMS could hold
states accountable where they fail to adopt rates that are adequate to
ensure that Medicaid beneficiaries have sufficient access to care, as
required by the equal access provision.
I. DECONSTRUCTING MEDICAID
To provide the necessary background and context for the discussion of the limitations of the current Medicaid enforcement scheme
discussed in Part II, this Part describes the federal-state partnership in
which Medicaid is grounded, providing an overview of both the development and operation of the Medicaid program. First, this Part
explains Medicaid’s current role in the American health care system
and how it grew from a small welfare program to a significant health
insurer. Next, this Part focuses on the operation of the Medicaid program, specifically, looking at how the state and federal governments
interact to administer state Medicaid programs and set provider reimbursement rates. This Part concludes with a description of litigation challenging Medicaid provider payment policies.
A. The History and Development of Medicaid
Enacted as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1965, Medicaid was created to provide medical care to the poor, blind, and disabled.33 When first created, most government officials and legislators
viewed Medicaid as a welfare program, not health insurance, as Med-

Despite its underfunding and large eligibility gaps, Medicaid has brought the rates of
poor people’s interactions with private doctors and hospitals up to, and sometimes
beyond, the rates posted by the middle class. And despite bizarrely inconsistent reimbursement rates among the various states, Medicaid has improved the life expectancy for all America’s poor, regardless of residence.”).
33. See id. at 48.
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icaid eligibility was tied to cash assistance.34 Since its inception, welfare (cash assistance to the poor) has faced forceful opposition, and
Medicaid did not escape the welfare stigma.35 Significantly, Medicaid
was “de-linked” from welfare in 1996.36 The 1996 Welfare Reform
Act ended the federal entitlement to cash benefits for the poor by
creating separate welfare programs administered by each state.37 Eligibility for welfare now had no bearing on eligibility for Medicaid.38
By “de-linking” Medicaid and cash assistance, states had greater flexibility in their Medicaid decision-making and Medicaid began to shift
out of the welfare frame and into the health insurance frame.39
Today, Medicare and Medicaid are the two largest components of
public health care spending in the United States.40 Medicare is a federal program that provides health coverage to about forty-seven million Americans, primarily individuals age sixty-five and older but also
including several million younger adults with permanent disabilities.41
Medicaid provides health coverage and long-term care services and
supports for sixty million low-income Americans including nearly
thirty million low-income children, eleven million persons with disabilities, and six million elderly individuals.42 Medicare is financed en-

34. See id. at 111 (Medicaid “was essentially a welfare program, not an insurance
program, and thus needed to be tightly wedded to existing welfare programs within
the statute bureaucracies, lest eligibility standards diverge.”). Medicaid was housed
within the existing state welfare departments and Congress described Medicaid beneficiaries as “recipients.” Id. at 48–49. By contrast, Medicare beneficiaries were referred to as “beneficiaries,” the usual term describing holders of private insurance
policies. Id. at 49.
35. See Saundra K. Schneider, The Impact of Welfare Reform on Medicaid, 28
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 161, 163 (1998).
36. See id. at 169.
37. See NAT’L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, ISSUE BRIEF: WELFARE REFORM AND ITS
IMPACT ON MEDICAID: AN UPDATE 5–6 (Feb. 26, 1999), http://www.nhpf.org/library/
issue-briefs/IB732_WelfRef&Mcaid_2-26-99.pdf. Immediately following the enactment of welfare reform, Medicaid enrollments declined. But the initial drop in Medicaid was soon followed by remarkable increases in the Medicaid population. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. See JENNIFER JENSEN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, GOVERNMENT
SPENDING ON HEALTH CARE BENEFITS AND PROGRAMS: A DATA BRIEF 2 (2008) (explaining that 77% of public funds allocated to health spending in 2007 was spent on
Medicare and Medicaid).
41. See KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICAID: A PRIMER 1 (2010), http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/upload/7334-04.pdf.
42. MACPAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 10.
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tirely with federal money; by contrast, the federal and state governments jointly fund Medicaid.43
In 2002, Medicaid surpassed Medicare for the first time as the largest government health care program, providing benefits to more people than any other public or private insurance program.44 Nationally,
Medicaid accounts for roughly 17% of all health care spending and
7% of the total federal budget.45 During the current economic recession, the number of Medicaid enrollees has grown as the number of
Americans affected by loss of work or declining income has risen.46
For federal fiscal year 2010, Medicaid spending totaled $406 billion,
with a federal share of $274 billion and a state share of $132 billion.47
For states, Medicaid represents a major budget item and the largest
source of federal revenues.48 The majority of spending is to reimburse hospital, physician, and other acute care providers, as well as
nursing home and other long-term care services.49
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), enacted
in 2010, will significantly expand the Medicaid program in 2014, requiring that states provide Medicaid coverage to all non-disabled
adults under age 65 with incomes up to 133% of the federal poverty
level.50 As a result of expanded eligibility, Medicaid is expected to
43. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT AND FINANCE OVERVIEW, available at https://www.cms.gov/medicaidrf/;

see also infra Part I.B.
44. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, supra note 43.
45. VERNON K. SMITH ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FOUNDATION, THE CRUNCH
CONTINUES: MEDICAID SPENDING, COVERAGE AND POLICY IN THE MIDST OF A RECESSION —RESULTS FROM A 50-STATE MEDICAID BUDGET SURVEY FOR STATE FISCAL YEARS 2009 AND 2010 9 (2009), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7985.pdf.
46. Since the start of the recession more than seven million people have enrolled
in Medicaid. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, TOP 5 THINGS TO
KNOW ABOUT MEDICAID Fig. 8 (2011), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8162.pdf.
47. MACPAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 38.
48. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, KEY QUESTIONS ABOUT
MEDICAID AND ITS ROLE IN STATE/FEDERAL BUDGETS AND HEALTH REFORM 1–2
(Jan. 2011), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8139.pdf. Densely populated states
spend significantly more money on Medicaid than smaller states. Although differences in population account for some of this variation, payments per enrollee also
vary widely by state. Id.
49. See id. at 2 (“In fiscal year 2009 . . . about three-fifths of federal and state
Medicaid spending was on hospital, physician, drugs, and other acute care services;
about a third was on nursing home and other long-term care services.”). For example, Medicaid accounts for 17% of all hospital spending. Medicaid Cost-Savings Opportunities, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (Feb. 3, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/02/20110203tech.html.
50. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 109 (2010). Un-
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cover up to eighty million Americans by 2019.51 It will be the largest
payer of health care in the United States, providing health insurance
to about sixty million Americans.52 Although the ACA dramatically
expands Medicaid eligibility, it does little to assure that Medicaid
beneficiaries have access to the care and services they require.53
Therefore, this Note argues that HHS, through CMS, must implement
additional administrative remedies to ensure state compliance with
the equal access provision, which will in turn ensure that Medicaid
beneficiaries have access to medical care and services “at least to the
extent” they are available to the “general population” in the same geographic area.54
B.

The Operation of Medicaid: A Federal and State Partnership

Medicaid is entangled in a complex web of relationships between
the federal government and the states. As noted above, the federal
and state governments jointly fund Medicaid.55 In return for agreeing
to implement Medicaid according to federal standards, all states receive “federal financial participation” (FFP) for their Medicaid expenditures based on their Federal Medical Assistance Percentage
(FMAP).56 In other words, the higher a state’s FMAP, the higher the
der the ACA, starting in 2014, twenty million more people will become eligible to enroll in Medicaid. Andrea M. Sisko, et al., National Health Spending Projections: The
Estimated Impact of Reform Through 2019, HEALTH AFFAIRS 5 (Oct. 2010). Provisions of the ACA, however, have been challenged, and on November 14, 2011, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider several questions relating to the constitutionality of the law. See Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. HHS, 648 F.3d 1235, 1241
(11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, No. 11-393, 2011 WL 5515162 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011),
cert granted, No. 11-398, 2011 WL 5515164 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011), cert. granted in part,
No. 11-400, 2011 WL 5515165 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011). Among other questions for review, the Court will decide whether the Medicaid expansion amounts to an unconstitutional coercion of state governments. See N.C. Aizenman, Supreme Court’s
Planned Review of Health-Care Law Shocks Medicaid Advocates, WASH. POST
(Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/courtreview-of-medicaid-expansion-could-have-massiveconsequences/2011/11/15/gIQA1LwkSN_story.html (explaining that supporters of the
law were surprised and disappointed that the Supreme Court agreed to review the
constitutionality of the extension of Medicaid to cover a greater number of the poor).
51. Sisko, supra note 50, at 4.
52. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 41, at 1.
53. See Bisgaier & Rhodes, supra note 15, at 2324 (“Health care reform has expanded eligibility to public insurance without fully addressing concerns about access.”).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2006).
55. See supra note 44.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2006) (describing the amount of federal funds to which a
state is “entitled”).
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percentage of a state’s Medicaid costs borne by the federal government.57 A state’s FMAP is based on its per capita income, with no
state receiving less than 50%.58 Mississippi has the highest FMAP at
74%, meaning that for every twenty-six cents Mississippi spends on
Medicaid, the federal government contributes seventy-four cents.59
Nationally, the average federal share of Medicaid (i.e. FMAP) is 57%
and the states’ share is 43%.60
In order to receive federal matching dollars, the Medicaid Act requires states to implement their Medicaid programs according to federal standards laid out in the law and corresponding regulations.61
For example, states are required to abide by the statutory eligibility
criteria.62 Although states must operate within federal guidelines, the
Medicaid Act and its regulations provide states a degree of flexibility
in determining eligibility standards, benefits packages, and provider
payment rates.63 As discussed in more detail below, a state must
submit a State Plan Amendment (SPA) to CMS whenever it makes a
“material change” to its Medicaid program.64 CMS then reviews the
SPA to ensure that the State is complying with the Medicaid law and
regulations.65 Therefore, even though states retain some flexibility in
setting provider reimbursement methodologies, all payment policies
must be set forth in the state’s Medicaid plan and any payment
changes must be reflected in a SPA.66
57. See generally ALISON MITCHELL & EVELYNE P. BAUMRUCKER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 7-5700, MEDICAID: THE FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
PERCENTAGE (FMAP) (2012).
58. Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expenditure, 75 Fed. Reg.
69082, 69082 (Nov. 10, 2010).
59. Id. at 69083.
60. Id.
61. See MACPAC REPORT, supra note 7, at 13.
62. Enrollment is based on categorical and financial eligibility and state residency/citizenship. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
63. Id.; see Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doctors, supra note 10, at 675–76
(noting that even as the list of federal requirements has grown, “states still retain a
large degree of flexibility in determining requirements for eligibility, in establishing
the scope of benefits covered, and in setting rates for reimbursement”).
64. 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(ii) (2011).
65. 42 C.F.R. § 430.10 (2011) (“The State plan contains all information necessary
for CMS to determine whether the plan can be approved to serve as a basis for Federal financial participation (FFP) in the State program.”); see Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. 287, n.1 (1985) (explaining that state must agree to comply with the federal
Medicaid law to receive federal funds).
66. The CMS website explains that CMS reviews State plan amendment reimbursement methodologies for services provided under the State plan for consistency
with Section 1902(a)(30)(A) of the Social Security Act and other applicable federal
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State Medicaid Plans

The Secretary of HHS, through CMS, monitors state Medicaid
programs to ensure that states implement their Medicaid programs
consistent with minimum federal requirements promulgated under
the federal Medicaid Act.67 To participate in Medicaid, a state must
submit a “plan for medical assistance”68 that explains how it will
spend its funds.69 Although participation is optional, all states have
elected to participate in the Medicaid program for the past thirty
years, and therefore have submitted State Plans that were originally
approved by CMS.70
A state must file a SPA with CMS when it seeks to enact a
“[m]aterial change [] in State law, organization, or policy” to the state
Medicaid program.71 The SPA must include a comprehensive written
statement containing all information necessary for CMS to determine
whether the plan can be approved.72 CMS reviews SPAs to ensure
that any changes to state Medicaid programs comply with a long list
of federal statutory and regulatory requirements.73 If the State Plan
with the proposed amendment satisfies these criteria, it is approved
and the states may receive FFP for any new Medicaid expenditures
consistent with the SPA.74
When a State submits a proposed SPA to CMS, CMS has ninety
days to determine whether the amendment complies with the Medicaid Act.75 If CMS does not respond within the ninety days, the
amendment is deemed approved and FFP for any additional Medi-

statutes and regulations. Medicaid Reimbursement & Finance, CENTERS FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidRF/.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (2006) (“The Secretary shall approve any plan which fulfills the conditions specified in subsection (a) . . . .”).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
69. See Community Health Center v. Wilson-Coker, 311 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir.
2002) (“States electing to participate in Medicaid must submit a plan detailing how
the State will expend its funds.”). At the state level, Medicaid is administered by a
single state agency charged with establishing and complying with a state Medicaid
plan that must comply with federal Medicaid law. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(5); 42 C.F.R.
§§ 430.10, 431.10 (2011).
70. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 48, at 1.
71. 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(1)(ii)
72. 42 C.F.R. § 430.10.
73. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.15(a)–(b).
74. 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(2)(ii).
75. 42 C.F.R. § 430.16(a)(1).
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caid spending is forthcoming.76 If CMS asks for more information,
the clock stops until CMS receives the requested information.77 After
receiving all requested information, CMS has another ninety days to
make a decision.78 If CMS rejects a proposed SPA, the State is entitled to petition CMS for reconsideration of the issue, and CMS is required to hold a hearing.79
In addition and distinct from the SPA approval process, the Secretary of HHS, through CMS, has discretion to withhold FFP from a
State if the State does not act in compliance with an approved plan, or
if an approved plan no longer complies with the requirements of the
Medicaid Act.80 Prior to withholding funding, CMS must initiate a
compliance action against a State, alleging that the State has failed to
abide by Medicaid rules and regulations.81 When this occurs, CMS
must notify the state that
no further payments will be made to the State (or that payments will
be made only for those portions or aspects of the program that are
not affected by the noncompliance), and [t]hat the total or partial
withholding will continue until the Administrator is satisfied that the
State’s plan and practice are, and will continue to be, in compliance
with Federal requirements.82

Federal funding may resume only when CMS is “satisfied that there
will no longer be [a] failure to comply” with the requirements imposed by the Medicaid Act.83
76. Id.; see New York ex rel. Perales v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 776, 779–80 (2d Cir.
1987) (finding that even if amendment to New York’s Medicaid plan were “deemed
accepted” by failure of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to reject
amendment until ninety days after amendment’s submission, the Secretary had continuing authority to determine approvability of state Medicaid plans; therefore, Secretary’s official rejection of amendment would serve to revoke any implied acceptance of amendment by Secretary’s delay in officially rejecting the amendment).
77. 42 C.F.R. § 430.16(a)(2).
78. Id.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (2006).
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c; 42 C.F.R. § 430.35(a); see also CENTER FOR MEDICARE
& MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT & FINANCE, http://www.cms.gov
/MedicaidRF/ (ensuring that [FFP] for the Medicaid program is paid consistently with
Federal requirements by reviewing State funding requests and claims); Letter from
Timothy M. Westmoreland, Director, Center for Medicaid & State Operations,
Health Care Financing Admin., U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to State Medicaid Directors (Jan. 2, 2011), http://www.cms.gov/SMDL/downloads/SMD010201.pdf
(explaining that the agency will not provide federal funds for any state plan amendment until the agency approves the amendment).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c; 42 C.F.R. § 430.35(a), (d).
82. 42 C.F.R. § 430.35(d)(1)(i)–(ii).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c.
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Medicaid regulations provide that if a State is dissatisfied with a
CMS final determination on a SPA or compliance with Federal requirements, the State may file a petition for judicial review.84 The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) additionally provides for judicial review of final agency action.85 The APA permits any person adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action to seek judicial review
of the lawfulness of that action.86 The reviewing court is required to
set aside agency action if it finds it to be “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”87 A final determination by CMS regarding the approval of a SPA or a
State’s compliance with Federal requirements must be upheld if it was
based upon a permissible construction of the relevant Medicaid
state.88

2.

Provider Payment Rates

A SPA must be submitted to CMS for approval and must describe
the policies and methods to be used to set payment rates for each
type of service included in the State Plan.89 Although States have
flexibility in determining their provider payment policies, including
their reimbursement rates, they must receive approval from CMS.90
84. 42 C.F.R. § 430.38(a).
85. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006).
86. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
87. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“[A]n agency rule [is] arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that
it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”).
88. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). “[If] a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. Chevron deference is required “when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force
of law, and . . . the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
The Supreme Court has also held that informal agency interpretations of a statute
such as those contained in an opinion letter, policy statement, agency manuals, or enforcement guidelines, are not entitled to Chevron-style deference. Christensen v.
Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–87 (2000); cf. Cal. Hosp. Ass’n v. Douglas, No. CV
11-9078 CAS, 2011 WL 6820229, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2011) (holding that Secretary’s approval of SPA is not entitled to Chevron deference).
89. 42 C.F.R. §§ 430.10, 447.201(b) (2011).
90. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. In addition to securing federal
approval for reimbursement rates and rate cuts, one commentator notes that Section
30(A) of the Medicaid Act sets a ceiling and a floor on payments. That is, “payments

BIENSTOCK_CHRISTENSEN

818

7/11/2012 8:21 AM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIX

CMS bases its approval on the state Medicaid agency’s assurances
that the State has complied with all Medicaid payment law and regulations.91
CMS typically has approved Medicaid payment rate reductions,92
although Medicaid reimbursement rates historically have been notably less than those of private payers and Medicare.93 On average,
States pay Medicaid providers about 72% of what Medicare pays,
which is already below market rate.94 Many providers lose money for
each Medicaid beneficiary they treat, as reimbursements are on average considerably lower than the costs of providing Medicaid beneficiaries with care.95 For example, CMS recently approved a 5% rate

[can] be no more than the cost of providing medical services efficiently and economically, but no less than the cost of providing recipients with access to the same quality
of services to which private-market and Medicare patients have access.” See
Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doctors, supra note 10, at 677.
91. 42 C.F.R. § 447.256(a)(2); see Jon Donenberg, Note, Medicaid and Benefi-

ciary Enforcement: Maintaining State Compliance with Federal Availability Requirements, 117 YALE L.J. 1498, 1506 (2008) (“Given the statutory enumeration of
the grounds upon which states can modify their Medicaid programs through the SPA
process, approval of amendments is generally straightforward and fairly predictable.
In some cases, CMS even provides ‘preprint’ sheets—skeleton forms that state administrators can fill in . . . .”).
92. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault on Litigation: Why
(and How) it Might Be Good for Health Law, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2323, 2340 (2010)
[hereinafter Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault] (noting that CMS has failed to
serve a “gatekeeping function” and instead, CMS tends to “rubber-stamp” state
plans); Mary K. Reinhart, Arizona Medicaid Cut Approved by Feds, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Nov. 26, 2011), http://www.azcentral.com/news/election/azelections/articles/2011/
11/25/20111125arizona-medicaid-cut-approved-by-feds.html.
93. See TRICIA M. MCGINNIS, JULIA BERENSON & NIKKI HIGHSMITH, CENTER
FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, INC., INCREASING PRIMARY CARE RATES, MAXIMIZING MEDICAID ACCESS AND QUALITY 2 (2011) (noting that “Medicaid has long reimbursed physician services at a lower rate than private payers and Medicare,” which
discourages physician participation); Stephen Zuckerman et al., Trends: Changes in
Medicaid Physician Fees, 1998–2003: Implications for Physician Participation, 4
HEALTH AFFAIRS 374, 379 (2004), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/
06/23/hlthaff.w4.374.full.pdf+html (noting that nationwide, the average Medicaid reimbursement rate is 69% of Medicare reimbursement).
94. Phil Galewitz, A Dozen States Slice Medicaid Payments to Doctors, Hospitals, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 6, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/
2011/July/06/states-cut-medicaid-payments-doctors-hospitals.aspx. Although different, both Medicare and Medicaid payment systems are prospective rather than retrospective. These prospective payment systems set a fixed rate in advance that does
not vary according to the nature or extent of treatment given. See Hall, supra note
29, at 300.
95. See WILL FOX & JOHN PICKERING, MILLIMAN, HOSPITAL & PHYSICIAN COST
SHIFT: PATIENT LEVEL COMPARISON OF MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND COMMERCIAL
PAYERS 6 (2008), http://publications.milliman.com/research/health-rr/pdfs/hospital-
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reduction for Arizona health care providers, which means Arizona
hospitals will now be paid 70% of what it costs to care for a Medicaid
patient.96 Many providers have left the Medicaid program due to inadequate payment rates.97 So long as state Medicaid programs underpay doctors and hospitals, the poor will face major barriers in accessing essential health care under the program, and will likely suffer
worse health outcomes as a result.98
Prior to 1980, Medicaid and Medicare rates were determined based
on a “reasonable cost” methodology.99 States thus had little flexibility
in setting payment rates. In the early 1980s, various acts of Congress,
including the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1980 and 1981,
provided states with enhanced flexibility in setting Medicaid payment

physician-cost-shift-RR12-01-08.pdf (noting that the hospital industry has found
Medicaid margins to be on average almost 15% lower than hospital costs).
96. See Reinhart, supra note 92. Pete Wertheim, vice president of the Arizona
Hospital and Healthcare Association stated that the “cumulative effect of all of these
cuts have really begun to take their toll on hospitals.” Id. On November 29, 2011, Arizona hospitals filed suit in the U.S. District Court in Phoenix, arguing that “the rate
cut will reduce patient access to health care providers, in violation of federal law.”
Mary K. Reinhart, Arizona Hospitals’ Lawsuit Aims to Block Medicaid Cut, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.azcentral.com/news/election/azelections/arti
cles/2011/11/29/20111129arizona-hospitals-lawsuit-aims-block-medicaid-cut.html.
The President and CEO of the Arizona Hospital and Healthcare Associations stated
that “[w]e’re asking the court to prevent . . . cut[s] that will otherwise force hospitals
to attempt to shift costs to purchasers of private health insurance . . . . The cost shift
amounts to a hidden health-care tax on all consumers.” Id.
97. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the highly publicized
case where a hospital in Michigan was forced to close its obstetrical unit due to the
state’s inadequate Medicaid payments, which reimbursed only 65% of the hospital’s
costs).
98. Roughly 17% of states reported problems with access to primary care for
Medicaid beneficiaries; 36% reported problems with access to specialty care; and
39% reported problems with access to dental care. VERNON K. SMITH ET AL., THE
HENRY J. KAISER FOUNDATION, HEADED FOR A CRUNCH: AN UPDATE ON MEDICAID
SPENDING, COVERAGE AND POLICY HEADING INTO AN ECONOMIC DOWNTURN; RESULTS FROM A 50-STATE MEDICAID BUDGET SURVEY FOR STATE FISCAL YEARS 2008
AND 2009 55 fig.29 (2008), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7815.pdf.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(E) (1979) (“reasonable cost related basis”), §
1396a(a)(30) (1976) (“reasonable charges”); see Rosemary H. Ratcliff, Note, The

Mistakes of Medicaid: Provider Payment During the Last Decade and Lessons for
Health Care Reform in the 21st Century, 35 B.C. L. REV. 141, 143 (1993) (“Prior to
1981, states were required to pay all [M]edicaid providers on the basis of uniform
[M]edicare “reasonable charges,” which were determined by the Secretary of
[HHS].”). For an in depth discussion of “reasonable cost” methodology, see Stephen
M. Weiner, “Reasonable Cost” Reimbursement for Inpatient Hospital Services Under Medicare and Medicaid: The Emergence of Public Control, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 1
(1977).
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rates.100 The key aspect of this change was the adoption of the Boren
Amendment, which allowed states to provide payment based on
methods and standards, that the state developed, so long as the rates
were “reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities.”101 The
Boren Amendment provided states flexibility in payment of providers, but also resulted in significant judicial oversight and scrutiny of
states’ Medicaid reimbursement rates.102 For example, in 1990, the
Supreme Court, in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association,103 affirmed that under the Boren Amendment institutional providers had
a private cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which permitted
them to challenge states’ low Medicaid reimbursement rates.104 Thus,
for a period of time, the Supreme Court in Wilder and Wilder’s progeny105 held that the Boren Amendment created a cause of action for
providers.106 But as the “burden of covering Medicaid costs grew,
States began to ‘clamor’ for the right to run their own programs.”107
And in 1997, Congress responded by repealing the Boren Amendment, which effectively reduced the likelihood that providers and
beneficiaries could raise successful challenges to states’ reimbursement rates.108

100. See Pub. L. No. 95-499 § 962(a), 94 Stat. 2650 (1980) (Boren Amendment);
Pub. L. No. 97-35 § 2173, 95 Stat. 808 (1981) (expanding Boren Amendment to apply
to hospitals); Pub. L. No. 97-35 § 2174(a), 95 Stat. 809 (1981) (removing “reasonable
charges” language from section 30(A)).
101. Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2650, § 962(a) (amending Section 1902(a)(13)(E)
of the Social Security Act).
102. See Dayna Bowen Matthew, The “New Federalism” Approach to Medicaid:

Empirical Evidence that Ceding Inherently Federal Authority to the States Harms
Public Health, 90 KY. L.J. 973, 983 (2002); see also Ratcliff, supra note 99, at 143
(“Recognizing the inherently inflationary nature of these payments, Congress
amended the federal Medicaid statute in 1980 and 1981 to allow states flexibility and
creativity in payment of providers, within general federal guidelines.”).
103. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
104. Id. at 509–10.
105. See Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491 (9th Cir. 1997); Methodist
Hosp. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026 (7th Cir. 1996); Visiting Nurse Ass’n of N. Shore v.
Bullen, 93 F.3d 997 (1st Cir. 1996); Ark. Med. Soc’y v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519 (8th Cir.
1993).
106. See Matthew, supra note 102, at 983.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 984.
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The Equal Access Provision

Repeal of the Boren Amendment meant that federal regulation of
state payment policies was left to 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A) (Section
(30)(A)).109 Section (30)(A) requires States to ensure that their payment policies (1) safeguard against unnecessary utilization of care; (2)
ensure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and
quality of care; and (3) “are sufficient to enlist enough providers so
that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available to the general population in the geographic area.”110 The second requirement sets a ceiling
on provider payments, whereas the third requirement, often referred
to as the equal access provision, sets a floor.111
Medicaid regulations preventing States from setting provider reimbursement rates above the Upper Payment Level (UPL) are derived
from the “efficiency” and “economy” language in Section (30)(A).112
The general rule that applies to each category of institutional providers is that “aggregate Medicaid payments to a group of facilities within one of the categories” may not exceed the maximum amount the
providers would have received under Medicare.113 As a result of these regulations, FFP will not be available to states for payments to
classes of providers in excess of the UPL.114 Thus, UPL is the federal

109. See Bradley J. Sayles, Preemption or Bust: A Review of the Recent Trends in
Medicaid Preemption Actions, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 120, 129 (2010)
(explaining that the repeal of the Boren Amendment “left § 1396a(a)(30) . . . as the
primary federal guideline for state reimbursement rates”).
110. 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2006).
[A state plan for medical assistance must] . . . provide such methods and
procedures relating to the utilization of, and the payment for, care and services available under the plan . . . as may be necessary to safeguard against
unnecessary utilization of such care and services and to assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are
sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available
under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available
to the general population in the geographic area. . . .

Id.
111. See Orthopaedic Hosp., 103 F.3d at 1497 (“Congress intended payments to be
flexible within a range; payments should be no higher than what is required to provide efficient and economical care, but still high enough to provide for quality care
and to ensure access to services.”).
112. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.271, 447.272(b), 447.321(b), 447.325 (2011).
113. 42 C.F.R. § 447.321(b)(2).
114. See DEBORAH BACHRACH, CENTER FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, PAYMENT REFORM: CREATING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR MEDICAID 7 (2010).
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government’s tool to ensure that States do not pay too much for Medicaid-covered services.115
The equal access provision of Section (30)(A) is the federal government’s tool to ensure that States do not pay too little, thereby impeding Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to services. The equal access
provision was originally added by amendment in 1989, although it had
been implemented previously through federal regulation.116 In codifying the equal access regulation, Congress stated that Medicaid payments must be at a level that “ensures that Medicaid beneficiaries
in . . . [a particular geographic] area have at least the same access to
physicians as the rest of the insured population in that area.”117
Some commentators suggest that in codifying the equal access provision Congress foresaw the temptation States would face to set low
reimbursement rates for healthcare providers, particularly when state
budgets were tight.118 Even with the enactment of the equal access
provision, however, States retain flexibility to establish their own reimbursement rate setting and payment systems. Although the process
for setting Medicaid reimbursement rates varies from state to state,
across the board state rates have been “significantly lower than those
of both Medicare and private insurers.”119 This discrepancy is problematic as reimbursement rates are an important determinant of provider participation and access to services for Medicaid beneficiaries.120 Generally, there is little incentive for physicians to participate
in Medicaid if their payments are too far below market levels.121
115. ANDY SCHNEIDER & DAVID ROUSSEAU, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID
AND THE UNINSURED, UPPER PAYMENT LIMITS: REALITY AND ILLUSION IN MEDICAID
FINANCING 3 (2002), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/secu
rity/getfile.cfm&PageID=14122.
116. See 42 C.F.R. § 447.204 (2011) (“The agency’s payments must be sufficient to
enlist enough providers so that services under the plan are available to recipients at
least to the extent that those services are available to the general population.”).
117. OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1989, H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at
390 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2116.
118. See, e.g., Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doctors, supra note 10, at 677.
119. See Rosemary B. Guiltinan, Enforcing a Critical Entitlement: Preemption
Claims as an Alternative Way to Protect Medicaid Recipient’s Access to Healthcare,
51 B. C. L. REV. 1583, 1592 (2010). Frequently, state reimbursement rates are set in a
state’s budget proposal, and the state agency that administers Medicaid will submit its
reimbursement methodology to CMS through a SPA. Alternatively, some states
have enacted statutes that prescribe a particular methodology for rate setting or a
specific rate for specific medical services. Id.
120. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
121. See Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid and Access to the Courts, 364 N. ENG. J.
MED. 1489, 1490 (2011) (suggesting that the equal access provision was included in
the Medicaid Act to ensure that the right to Medicaid is more than an “empty prom-
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Thus, low reimbursement rates can impede access to health care for
Medicaid beneficiaries.122
On average, states pay 43% of all Medicaid expenditures, and with
the exception of Vermont, all States must produce annual balanced
budgets (unlike the federal government).123 Thus, States have strong
incentives to manage carefully their Medicaid programs’ cost
growth.124 States look to cut Medicaid spending in order to close their
budget gaps.125 During an economic recession, the economy goes
down, while Medicaid enrollment goes up.126 “Historically, for every
ise of care”); Bruce C. Vladeck & Stephen I. Vladeck, Killing Medicaid the California Way, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2011, at A31; see also Andrew R. Gardella, The Equal
Access Illusion: A Growing Majority of Federal Courts Erroneously Foreclose Private Enforcement of § 1396A(A)(30) of the Medicaid Act Using 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38
U. MEM. L. REV. 697, 756 (2008) (“When states fail to set economically rational reimbursement rates, providers have no economic incentive to treat Medicaid patients,
thus leaving Medicaid beneficiaries without access to medical care.”); Guiltinan, supra note 119, at 1592–93 (“Physicians frequently cite low Medicaid reimbursement
rates as their principal reason for refusing to accept Medicaid patients.”).
122. See Guiltinan, supra note 119, at 1593; Peter J. Cunningham & Len M. Nichols, The Effects of Medicaid Reimbursement on the Access to Care of Medicaid Enrollees: A Community Perspective, 62 MED. CARE & RES. 676 (2005).
123. Whether all states require a balanced budget can be disputed, depending on
the way the requirements are defined. The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) has traditionally reported that forty-nine states must balance their
budgets, with Vermont being the exception. Other authorities add Wyoming and
North Dakota as exceptions, and some authorities in Alaska contend that it does not
have an explicit requirement for a balanced budget. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS
2 (2010) (“Two points can be made with certainty, however: most states have formal
balanced budget requirements with some degree of stringency, and state political cultures reinforce the requirements.”).
124. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 48, at 2.
125. See NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS,
supra note 16, at 28 (noting that “cost containment in Medicaid is a dominant theme”
and “nearly every state implemented at least one new Medicaid policy to address
costs in fiscal year 2011.” “[A]s in previous years, provider rate restrictions were the
most commonly reported cost containment strategy.”). For recommendations on
containing Medicaid costs without cutting provider rates, see MICHELLE LILIENFELD
& JANE PERKINS, NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, FACT SHEET: MEDICAID COST
CONTAINMENT WITHOUT HARMING BENEFICIARIES (2011), http://www.healthlaw.org/
images/stories/FS_Medicaid_CC_Sept_2011_NHeLPv2.pdf.
126. Therefore, it is not surprising that provider rate reductions and restrictions
was the most commonly reported cost containment strategy reported for FY 2011–
2012. SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 7. “A total of 39 states [reduced or] restricted
provider rates in FY 2011 and 46 states reported plans to do so in FY 2012.” Id.; see
also THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, MEDICAID COST
CONTAINMENT: RECENT PROPOSALS AND TRENDS 2 (2011) (“39 states in Fiscal Year
2010 implemented a provider rate cut or freeze compared to 33 states in FY 2009. In
FY 2011, 37 states planned provider rate restrictions.”). Increased federal assistance
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1% increase in the national unemployment rate, state revenues decline an average of 3 to 4% and enrollment in Medicaid increases by
one million new recipients.”127 As unemployment rises, more people
enroll in state Medicaid programs, but States have less tax revenue to
pay for them.128 The countercyclical nature of the Medicaid program
results in greater Medicaid expenditures, when States can least afford
it.129 In response, States must look for ways to contain Medicaid expenditures, and reducing provider payments is often seen as the only
or best option.130

b.

Enforcing the Equal Access Provision

State payments policies are under increasing scrutiny. Providers
are vociferously opposing budget-driven rate cuts, and policy makers
are taking note of the opposition, especially in light of the forthcoming expansion of the Medicaid program under the health reform law.
The equal access provision provides a standard by which to judge
payment adequacy in Medicaid.131 On May 6, 2011, CMS issued a
proposed amendment to the Medicaid regulations to clarify states’
obligations under the equal access provision and “create a standardized, transparent process for States” to assess whether their rates are

through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s (ARRA) enhanced FMAP
helped support state budgets and their Medicaid programs and reduced the state
share of Medicaid costs in FY 2009 and FY 2010, but the expiration of these funds
means that a large increase in state funding will be necessary for state Medicaid programs in FY 2012. SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 16.
127. Randy Edwards, The Medicaid Trap, H&HN MAGAZINE (Jan. 2010).
128. See NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS,
supra note 16, at 28 (“Medicaid spending, similar to health care spending is projected
to increase faster than the economy as a whole.”).
129. See Shefall S. Kulkarni, Puzzling Out How to Help States with Hard-Hit Medicaid Budgets, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 18, 2011), http://capsules.kaiserhealth
news.org/index.php/2011/11/puzzling-out-how-to-help-states-with-hard-hit-medicaidbudgets/.
130. See THE NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, MEDICAID COST CONTAINMENT: RECENT PROPOSALS AND TRENDS 2 (2011) (“Provider rates are linked to
economic conditions and under budget pressure states are often forced to reduce
rates until economic conditions improve.”).
131. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (noting that Section 30(A) of the
Medicaid Act sets a ceiling and a floor on payments). But Section 30(A) does not
explicitly mention provider costs or cost studies and three circuit courts have determined that CMS need not consider provider costs in deciding whether or not to approve a State Plan Amendment. See Rite Aid v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 853 (3d Cir.
1999); Minn. Homecare Ass’n v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917, 918 (8th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam); Methodist Hosps. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 1996).
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sufficient.132 Prior to the proposal of this rule, states had very little
guidance from CMS on how to assess whether state payment policies
provide for sufficient access to beneficiaries under Section (30)(A).133
Moreover, even though CMS has the authority to enforce the federal
statute against state agencies, “it has never created an enforcement
scheme that [has worked] to police state failures.”134
Until the rule proposed in 2011, CMS provided little guidance to
states on rate-setting and rarely found rates too low, instead focusing
its attention on ensuring that rates were not too high.135 Historically,
Medicaid providers and beneficiaries challenged rate cuts by bringing
judicial action against state Medicaid agencies to enjoin states from
reducing provider reimbursement rates that allegedly violated the
Medicaid Act’s equal access provision.136 The federal circuit courts
split in their analysis of the substantive requirements of the equal access provision.137 But this circuit split on the merits has been put on
132. 76 Fed. Reg. 26342 (May 6, 2011). For further discussion of CMS’ proposed
rule see infra Part II.A.1.
133. See Rosenbaum, supra note 121, at 1490 (explaining that despite the fact that
the federal government has had the power to provide oversight of states’ reimbursement rates and compliance with the equal access provision under the federal Medicaid statute for twenty-two years, HHS has “never issued detailed compliance standards, much less enforced them”).
134. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault, supra note 92, at 2341.
135. See Nicole Huberfield, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section
1983, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 462 (2008) (noting that
CMS “is notoriously uninterested in enforcing the terms of State plans against the
states; instead it seeks cooperation, when it makes demands at all”); see also Matthew, supra note 102, at 989–90 (“Researchers have documented the fact that disparity among the states’ Medicaid coverage and expenditures increases as federal oversight of the program decreases.”).
136. See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (allowing private enforcement of a Medicaid Act provision concerning payment for institutional services).
137. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits addressed the procedures a state undertook
before setting rates, while the Third and Seventh Circuits focused on the effects of a
state’s payment rate. See Rite Aid v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 851–52, 856 (finding
that although the equal access provision only requires a “result,” not a “process,” the
process cannot be arbitrary and capricious, but the court noted that “although budgetary provisions may not be the sole basis for a rate revision, they may be considered
given that [Section (30)(A)] mandates an economical result”); Orthopaedic Hosp. v.
Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1496 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the equal access provision
specifically requires that state payment rates “bear a reasonable relationship” to the
cost of providing service and that states cannot set payment rates without “responsible cost studies”); Methodist Hosp. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 1996)
(finding that the equal access provision does not require states to conduct access
studies in advance of modifying their rates); Ark. Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d
529, 530 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that the lack of procedural safeguards (i.e. cost studies) combined with the fact that the only apparent justification for the reimbursement
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hold. In 2002, the Supreme Court issued a decision that called into
question whether Medicaid providers and beneficiaries even have
standing to seek judicial relief.138 Ten years later, the Supreme Court
has yet to take a definitive stance on the standing issue, but the
Court’s most recent decision in Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California undoubtedly suggests that the right of beneficiaries and providers to challenge rate cuts in the courts is dubious
at best.139
The Medicaid Act, unlike the statute underlying Medicare, does
not expressly address the question of whether private parties have access to the courts to prevent injury resulting from state action.140 Prior to 2002, Medicaid providers and beneficiaries enforced the equal
access provision by bringing suit against states pursuant to a civil
rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983).141 In Gonzaga University v. Doe,142 however, the Supreme Court held that a federal law is
not privately enforceable unless Congress has unambiguously manifested its intent to confer individual rights on the beneficiary of a
statute.143 Following this decision, a majority of the circuit courts

cuts was budgetary, meant that the Arkansas Department of Human Services was in
violation of the equal access provision).
138. See generally Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
139. 132 S. Ct. 546, No. 09-958, 2012 WL 555204 (Feb. 22, 2012). The Court granted certiorari to decide whether Medicaid providers and recipients may maintain a
cause of action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce a federal Medicaid law, which
providers and beneficiaries argued conflicted with and therefore preempted state
Medicaid statutes that reduce payments to providers. Id. at *2. In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to determine whether the plaintiffs’ case on the Supremacy Clause can move forward in light of the federal government’s post-oral argument approval of the challenged rate reductions. Id.;
see also Jason Millman, SCOTUS Punts on Calif. Medicaid Suit, POLITICO (Feb. 22,
2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/73165.html (noting that even
though the lawsuit is still valid, the Court’s opinion suggests that the Supremacy
Clause is not the right way to challenge [Medicaid] rate cuts).
140. See Rosenbaum, supra note 121, at 1489.
141. See Rite Aid, 171 F.3d 842; Minn. Home Care Ass’n v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917;
Orthopaedic Hosp., 103 F.3d 1491; Methodist Hosp., Inc., 91 F.3d 1026; Visiting
Nurse Ass’n of N. Shore v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997 (1st Cir. 1996); Ark. Med. Soc’y, 6
F.3d 519; see also supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court’s judicial enforcement of the now-repealed Boren Amendment in Wilder and
its progeny). For further discussion of the lawsuits challenging low or reduced Medicaid provider payment rates under 1983, see CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, MEDICAID PAYMENT RATE LAWSUITS: EVOLVING COURT VIEWS MEAN UNCERTAIN FUTURE FOR MEDI-CAL (Oct. 2009).
142. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
143. See id. at 280.
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have found the equal access provision unenforceable under Section
1983.144
Without a cause of action under Section 1983, Medicaid providers
and beneficiaries turned to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,
seeking relief based on a preemption claim.145 That is, plaintiffs have
argued that state laws “interfere with, or are contrary to” federal
law.146 In Douglas, a consolidation of several legal challenges,147 California Medicaid providers and beneficiaries challenged cuts to California’s Medicaid reimbursement rates.148 Plaintiffs, including pharmacies, health care providers, and senior citizens’ groups, argued that
the cuts violated the equal access provision of the Medicaid Act and
therefore were preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.149

144. See Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 702–03 (5th Cir.
2007), cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 34 (2008); N.Y. Ass’n of Homes & Servs. for the Aging,
Inc. v. DeBuono, 444 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2006); Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139,
1146–48 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 535 U.S. 1305 (2007); Westside Mothers v.
Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 541–43 (6th Cir. 2006); Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051,
1062 (9th Cir. 2005); Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50,
56–59 (1st Cir. 2004); see also SARAH SOMERS, NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM,
SUPREME COURT GRANTS REVIEW OF MEDICAID CASES 3 (Jan. 2011). For further
discussion of the judicial enforcement of the equal access provision following Gonzaga, see generally JANE PERKINS, NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, UPDATE ON
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE MEDICAID ACT PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Nov.
2011); Gardella, supra note 121; Brian J. Dunne, Enforcement of the Medicaid Act
Under 42 USC § 1983 After Gonzaga University v. Doe: The “Dispassionate Lens”
Examined, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 911 (2007).
145. See Maxwell-Jolly v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 572 F.3d 644, 650 (9th Cir.
2009); Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 509 (8th Cir. 2006).
146. Lankford, 451 F.3d at 509–10 (quoting Wisc. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 510
U.S. 597 (1991)).
147. The consolidated cases encompassed five lawsuits and produced seven decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See Santa Rosa Memorial Hosp.
v. Maxwell-Jolly, 380 F. App’x. 656 (9th Cir. 2010); Dominguez v. Schwarzenegger,
596 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2010); Cal. Pharm. Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 596 F.3d 1098 (9th
Cir. 2010); Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 374 F.App’x 690 (9th Cir.
2010); Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 342 F. App’x. 306 (9th Cir.
2009); Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009); Cal.
Pharm. Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2009).
148. 132 S. Ct. 546, No. 09-958, 2012 WL 555204 (Feb. 22, 2012).
149. Brief for Petitioners, Douglas, 2012 WL 555204 (No. 09-958), 2011 WL
2062344, at *26. For an in depth discussion of whether providers and beneficiaries
can enforce the equal access provision through the Supremacy Clause, see Matthew
McKennan, Medicaid Access After Health Reform: The Shifting Legal Basis for
Equal Access, 7 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 477, 499–503 (2011); Guiltinan, supra
note 119, at 1601–22; Sayles, supra note 109, at 136–48.
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The lawsuits were filed after California lawmakers in 2008 and
2009 passed three statutes reducing reimbursement rates.150 Medicaid
providers and beneficiaries filed a series of lawsuits seeking to enjoin
the rate reductions on the ground that they conflicted with and therefore were preempted by federal Medicaid law, specifically, the equal
access provision.151 The Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed or ordered
preliminary injunctions that prevented the State from implementing
its statutes.152
While these cuts were being challenged in the courts, California
was also seeking approval from CMS.153 Although the cuts were effective July 1, 2008, California did not submit SPAs regarding the rate
cuts until September 30, 2008.154 Over two years after California had
implemented its rate cuts, CMS denied the SPA on November 18,
2010, for lack of adequate information.155 California sought reconsideration of CMS’ disapproval and a hearing to reconsider was held on
February 10, 2011.156
Meanwhile, California appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to enjoin California’s rate cuts and the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to decide whether Medicaid providers and recipients may maintain a
cause of action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce a federal
Medicaid law.157 On October 27, 2011, less than a month after the

150. See Douglas, 2012 WL 555204.
The first statute, enacted in February 2008, reduced by 10% payments that
the State makes to various Medicaid providers, such as physicians, pharmacies, and clinics. See 2007–2008 Cal. Sess. Laws, 3d Extraordinary Sess. Ch.
3, §§ 14, 15. The second statute, enacted in September 2008, replaced the
10% rate reductions with a more modest set of cuts. See 2008 Cal. Sess.
Laws ch. 758 §§ 45, 57. And the last statute, enacted in February 2009,
placed a cap on the State’s maximum contribution to wages and benefits
paid by counties to providers of in-home supportive services. See 2009–2010
Cal. Sess. Laws, 3d Extraordinary Sess. Ch. 13 § 9.
Id. at *3.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id. at *4.
154. See Brief of Intervenor Respondents, Douglas, 2012 WL 555204 (No. 09-958),
2011 WL 3288335, at *6.
155. See Notice of Hearing: Reconsideration of Disapproval of California State
Plan Amendments (SPAs) 08-009A; 08-009B1; 08-009B2; 08-009D; and 08-019, 75
Fed. Reg. 80058-01 (Dec. 21, 2010).
156. Id.
157. See Douglas, 2012 WL 555204, at *2.
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Supreme Court heard oral argument in the Douglas case,158 CMS approved some of California’s rate cuts.159 In light of CMS’ decision,
the Supreme Court in Douglas, in a five to four decision, vacated the
Ninth Circuit’s judgments and remanded the cases.160 Justice Breyer,
writing for the majority, found that although the case was not moot,
the lower courts would have to determine whether the plaintiffs could
continue to proceed under the Supremacy Clause or should instead
challenge CMS’ approval of California’s rate cuts under the APA,
noting the deference generally given to agency decision-making.161
The majority opinion notes that “to allow a Supremacy Clause action
to proceed once the agency has reached a decision threatens potential
inconsistency or confusion.”162 Although the majority declined to decide whether the Supremacy Clause provides a cause of action to enforce the requirements of the Medicaid Act, the opinion casts doubt
on the availability of a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause.163
According to both California164 and the federal government,165
HHS, through CMS, is responsible for enforcing the equal access pro158. Oral argument took place on October 3, 2011. See Transcript of Oral Argument, at 2, Douglas, 2012 WL 555204, http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/09-958.pdf.
159. See Department of Health Care Services (DHCS) Announce Federal Approval of Medical Budget Reductions, CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/formsandpubs/publications/opa/Docu
ments/11-06%20SPA%20Approvals.pdf. CMS based its decision to ultimately approve many of California’s cuts on a study submitted by the state to CMS indicating
that cuts would not curtail access to care and that DHCS would also set up a data collection and monitoring plan “to ensure that access to care is not compromised as the
reductions are implemented.” CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES, MONITORING ACCESS TO MEDI-CAL COVERED HEALTHCARE SERVICES (2011),
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/Documents/Rate%20Reductions/Developing%20a%20Healt
hcare%20Access%20Monitoring%20System.pdf.
160. See Douglas, 2012 WL 555204, at *6.
161. Id. at *5.
162. Id.
163. Id. at *6. Instead, the majority suggests that the changed circumstances may
require the respondents to proceed by seeking review of the agency determination
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Id. at *5.
[The] agency decision does not change the underlying substantive question,
namely whether California’s statutes are consistent with a specific federal
statutory provision . . . . But it may change the answer. And it may require
respondents now to proceed by seeking review of the agency determination
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., rather than in an action against California under the Supremacy Clause.

Id.
164. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 149, at *26 (arguing that the purposes of
Section (30)(A) reflected in the statute’s text and structure and the legislative history
is to preserve and enhance “the States’ flexibility to control and reduce costs and in-
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vision, not the courts.166 Although Medicaid law and regulations create an administrative enforcement scheme to ensure that states’ reimbursement rates do not violate the equal access provision, many have
argued, including former HHS officials, that exclusive enforcement by
the federal agency is “logistically, practically, legally and politically
unfeasible.”167 By contrast, others suggest that shifting enforcement
of the equal access provision from judicial forums to executive agencies may be wise.168 Part II of this Note examines the administrative
compliance mechanisms available to and utilized by CMS, considering whether the administrative processes established under the Medicrease the efficiency of Medicaid,” and to centralize “enforcement authority in
HHS,” and to protect the “States from private lawsuits that drive up the cost of Medicaid”).
165. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Douglas,
2012 WL 555204 (No. 09-958), 2011 WL 2132705, at *31–*32 (arguing Section
(30)(A)’s language suggests that a nonstatutory private right of action should not be
recognized and that the “administrative process brings to bear ‘the expertise, uniformity, widespread consultation, and resulting administrative guidance that can accompany agency decisionmaking’” (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 292
(2002) (Breyer, J., concurring))). But see Brief of Former HHS Officials as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Douglas, 2012 WL 555204 (No. 09-958), 2011 WL
3706105, at *5 (“Private enforcement . . . provides a means for meaningful statutory
enforcement both until and unless the Secretary has the opportunity to exercise her
discretion, and to ensure that the Secretary is acting within her discretion.”).
166. See Rosenbaum, supra note 121, at 1490 (noting that the state argues that enforcement of Medicaid law by the federal government is sufficient); Vladeck, supra
note 121.
167. Brief of Former HHS Officials, supra note 165, at *3.
First, because the Medicaid Act contemplated—and has historically been
understood to allow—direct redress by beneficiaries, neither CMS nor HHS
has the resources to provide comprehensive oversight of state-by-state compliance with the equal access provision. Second, because funds for the administration of Medicaid are provided by appropriation, they are subject to
far greater congressional budget constraints than Medicaid benefits. Third,
as CMS itself has repeatedly conceded, it is limited both practically and legally in its authority to both enforce § 30(A) and provide remedies for violations thereof. Fourth, and finally, even in the absence of such constraints,
the “cooperative federalism” behind Medicaid means that the Executive
Branch is under far more political pressure from states than from private
parties.
Id. at *3–*4.
168. See Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault, supra note 92, at 2382 (noting
that judges are bad at understanding, evaluating, and creating health care regulations
and suggesting that “we should embrace the reallocation of regulatory authority” because “federal executive agencies are significantly better positioned” than the
courts). See generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Law and Administrative Law:
A Marriage Most Convenient, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2004) (suggesting that there are
advantages to having the executive branch regulate health care over both the judiciary and the market).
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caid law and regulations provide a sufficiently powerful tool to enable
CMS to ensure compliance with the equal access provision.
II. ASSESSING THE ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT SCHEME
WITH R ESPECT TO THE E QUAL A CCESS P ROVISION
As discussed in Part I, there are two primary administrative remedies available to CMS to ensure state compliance with the federal
Medicaid Act, including the equal access provision.169 First, through
the SPA process, CMS is able to review and approve or disapprove a
state’s payment policies and any amendments thereto.170 If CMS disapproves a state plan or plan amendment, the state may seek reconsideration from the agency.171 If the agency subsequently upholds the
decision, the state may petition for judicial review under Medicaid
regulations and private parties, and states may challenge final agency
action under the APA.172 Second, and separate and apart from the
SPA process, the Secretary has the discretion to deny federal funds if
the state’s payment policies do not comply with the equal access provision.173
Neither the SPA process nor the authority to withhold federal
funds, however, appear to be effective tools for ensuring state compliance with the equal access provision.174 This procedural shortfall is
because states do not require additional federal matching dollars
when they decrease rates and therefore often act before the federal
government has completed the SPA procedure.175 And, as noted
above, aggrieved parties have previously sought injunctive relief under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, and more recently, under the
Supremacy Clause; however, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gonzaga and Douglas strongly suggest that these judicial avenues are no
longer viable, highlighting the need for an effective and timely administrative remedy.176
169. See supra Part I.B.
170. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text. The U.S. Government Accountability Office has criticized CMS for poor oversight of the states, emphasizing
holes in the data provided by the states. See George France, The Form and Context
of Federalism: Meanings for Health Care Financing, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
649, 689 (2008).
175. See infra notes 180–188 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 143–44, 163 and accompanying text.
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A. SPA Process
Requiring states to seek approval from CMS through the SPA process gives CMS the opportunity to review a state Medicaid plan to determine whether the state is in compliance with federal Medicaid laws
and regulations.177 When states seek to increase reimbursement rates,
they submit a SPA describing the planned increase in order to receive
federal approval before they implement.178 States will delay implementation pending approval because they want to be certain that federal matching dollars will be forthcoming with respect to the increased payment amount.179 There is no comparable incentive to
delay implementation with respect to a rate decrease. In fact, states
do not always submit a SPA when decreasing reimbursement rates.
States do not need more federal matching dollars in this situation;
they need less. In addition, states are anxious to reap the budgetary
relief connected with rate cuts.
CMS often withholds approval of SPAs that seek to increase reimbursement rates in violation of Section (30)(A) and the UPL;180 however, there are few examples of CMS denying SPAs that cut reimbursement rates.181 Given its financial participation, the federal
government has a strong incentive to provide substantial oversight of
states’ efforts to increase provider rates, as approval would result in
the federal government having to pay more money to the states.182
By contrast, CMS has less incentive to deny a SPA that seeks to cut
reimbursement rates in a way that may violate the equal access provi177. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (explaining that federal funds will
not be provided for any state plan amendment until the agency approves the amendment).
179. Without federal funds, state budget expenditures would rise by 22.5%, which
one commentator suggests would create an unbearable burden for any state, especially in the midst of a nationwide fiscal crunch. See Peter Suderman, ObamaCare’s
Medicaid Mandate, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001
424052970203824904577213642801222230.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.
180. See Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doctors, supra note 10, at 682 n.43 (noting that the federal government commonly relies on a state’s violation of Section
(30)(A) and the regulatory UPL to justify a disallowance of FFP).
181. See CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, MEDICAID PAYMENT RATE
LAWSUITS: EVOLVING COURT VIEWS MEAN UNCERTAIN FUTURE FOR MEDI-CAL 4
(2009) (“In practice, federal agency oversight and action primarily has been focused
on restricting state payments to providers, while enforcement of beneficiary safeguards has been relatively limited.”).
182. See Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault, supra note 92, at 2341 (“On the
occasion that CMS does reject state plans or insist on amendments thereto, it almost
always does so to protect its own funds from perceived state raids.”).
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sion.183 Former HHS officials point out that there is no realistic financial incentive for CMS to enforce aggressively the equal access
provision against states’ cutting rates, since violations of the provision
would save the federal government money.184 Instead, since CMS has
discretion to take action against non-compliant states, the federal
government often prefers to seek “cooperation”185 from states that
want to cut reimbursement rates rather than disapproving SPAs or
withholding federal funds. In the past, CMS has focused almost exclusively on ensuring that payment rates are not too high and do not
exceed the UPL. More recently, CMS has expanded its focus to include rate reductions in light of state budget-driven rate cuts that
threaten to reduce provider capacity just as millions more Americans
will become eligible for Medicaid in 2014.186
Until recently, CMS had “sought to monitor and promote access
through informal processes, principally by raising the issue of the adequacy of rates in meetings and correspondence with state authorities.”187 Even the proposed rule CMS published in May 2011 reflects
this approach, creating new means of promoting adherence to Section
(30)(A) short of federal disapproval or compliance proceedings.188
183. See id.
184. Brief of Former HHS Officials, supra note 165, at *25–*26 (“If anything, because poorer states tend to have the highest percentage of their Medicaid outlays reimbursed by the federal government, the states under the greatest pressure to cut
costs will be those in which the federal government spends (and stands comparatively
to save) the highest proportion of funds.”).
185. Huberfield, supra note 135, at 462 (explaining that CMS monitors states’
compliance with federal rules through informal processes).
186. See Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26348 (proposed May 6, 2011) (noting that since 2008,
CMS has asked states to provide more information “to help the agency determine
that the changes to rates resulting from State plan amendments will continue to provide for access to care consistent with the Act and the implementing regulations”).
187. Brief of Former HHS Officers, supra note 165, at *25 (citing Brief of Amicus
Curiae Secretary of Health & Human Services at 12, Clark v. Kizer, 758 F. Supp. 572
(E.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 87-1700)). States may be more inclined to “cooperate” with
the federal government when they are in need of federal matching funds, but may be
less inclined where they simply want to cut Medicaid funding. For example, after
California submitted a SPA to HHS regarding rate cuts on September 30, 2008, CMS
requested that California provide additional information, but California never responded. Instead, California continued to implement the rate cuts without CMS approval. See Brief of Intervenor Respondents, supra note 154, at *6.
188. See Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26345 (proposed May 6, 2011). At the time this Note
was written, CMS had not issued a final rule. Unfortunately, there is no way of
knowing whether the final rule will look anything like the proposed rules. Moreover,
proposed rules take a long time to be finalized as they often face enormous political
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The proposed rule seeks to clarify and reinforce that beneficiary access must be considered in setting and adjusting payment methodologies for Medicaid services and emphasize that payment rate changes
are not in compliance with the equal access provision if they result in
a denial of sufficient access to covered care and services.189
The proposed rule provides a framework for states to assess access
to care.190 States would be required to conduct medical assistance access reviews191 for every covered Medicaid service.192 Under the proposed rule, if a state Medicaid agency seeks to reduce or restructure
Medicaid payment rates, the agency would be required to submit,
along with the SPA, an access review for the service in question that
has been completed within the prior twelve months and that demonstrates sufficient access.193 Finally, the agency would have to develop
procedures to monitor continued access to care after implementation
of the payment rate reduction or restructuring.194 The rule’s access
framework, CMS contends, is intended to provide additional guidance to states on the standards the states must follow to demonstrate
that their Medicaid beneficiaries have sufficient access to medical services.195

pressures from states and other stakeholders. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION, PROVIDER PAYMENT AND ACCESS TO MEDICAID SERVICES: A SUMMARY OF CMS’ MAY 6 PROPOSED RULE 3, (2011) (“Given the high level of interest in
the proposed rule . . . and the different perspectives . . . on . . . whether it goes far
enough or too far, it is difficult to anticipate what shape the final rule will take.”);
Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid and Access to Health Care—A Proposal for Continued
Inaction?, 365 N. ENGL. J. MED. 102, 103 (2011).
189. See Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,342, 26,343 (proposed May 6, 2011); THE HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 188, at 1.
190. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 188, at 1.
191. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26345 (proposed May 6, 2011).
192. Such reviews are not currently required. The state Medicaid agency
would have to review access to a subset of Medicaid-covered services every
year, and review access to every Medicaid-covered service at least once every five years. Each state would have discretion as to the measures it uses to
analyze access to care and the services it reviews in any given year.
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 188, at 2.
193. Along with the SPA, the agency would also have to submit an analysis reflecting its consideration of beneficiary and stakeholder input on the impact of the proposed rate change on continued access to the affected service. Id.
194. Id.
195. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26348 (proposed May 6, 2011).

BIENSTOCK_CHRISTENSEN

2012]

7/11/2012 8:21 AM

STATE MEDICAID PAYMENT POLICIES

835

Notably, the proposed rule does not specify what, if any, consequences states would face if they failed to comply with the new requirements.196 Although the proposed rule acknowledges that states
have previously failed to take access determinations seriously,197 the
rule notes that rather than disapproving state rate cuts or instituting
compliance actions against states whose cuts violate the equal access
provision, CMS’ strategy “is designed to allow for State and Federal
review of beneficiary access to evolve over time and for States to implement effective and efficient approaches and solutions that are appropriate to their local and perhaps changing circumstances.”198 Several comments to the proposed rule argue that the rule “does not go
far enough in establishing a mechanism for measuring access to care
that is . . . enforceable.”199 Although the proposed rule may provide a
useful framework for states to assess whether provider reimbursement rates comply with the equal access provision and are sufficient
to ensure access to services, it does not provide a clear remedy to
compel compliance when state resources are sparse.200
Significantly, the Medicaid Act and regulations are unclear as to
whether CMS approval is required before states may implement rate
cuts.201 In Exeter Memorial Hospital Ass’n v. Belshe,202 the Ninth
196. See Rosenbaum, supra note 188, at 103 (describing the proposed rules as a
“model of inaction”).
197. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26348 (“When asked for additional detail on the methodology that States used to determine compliance with the access requirement, only a
few States indicated that they relied upon actual data to make a determination.”).
198. Id. at 26344. The proposed rule, however, goes on to clarify that at §
447.204(b) CMS “may disapprove a proposed rate reduction or restructuring SPA
that does not include or consider the data review and a public process.” Id. at 26352.
Alternatively, CMS can take compliance action in accordance with regulation at 42
C.F.R. § 430.35 in these instances. Id.
199. Comment of Center on Budget and Policy Priorities at 1 (July 5, 2011), in response to Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342.
200. See Rosenbaum, supra note 188, at 103 (noting that “because the rule specifies neither standards for adequate access nor an independent evidentiary process, it
would be nearly impossible for the federal government to enforce the rule.”); see also
Comment of Greater New York Hospital Association, at 3 (July 5, 2011), in response
to Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services,
76 Fed. Reg. 26,342 (noting that states must have flexibility to develop measures to
demonstrate compliance with the access measurement framework “given the limited
resources that many state Medicaid programs have to devote to such analyses.”).
201. See 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(2) (“Prompt submittal of amendments is necessary .
. . [s]o that CMS can determine whether the plan continues to meet the requirements
for approval, [and] to ensure the availability of FFP.”).
202. 145 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Circuit held that California’s Medicaid agency could not implement a
SPA that was submitted to CMS but not yet approved.203 California
argued that the rate cuts were in compliance with the (now repealed)
Boren Amendment, and thus could be implemented.204 The Court
found that to permit implementation before a SPA is approved would
put “a reimbursement rate in place for a considerable time period
that had never been approved, that may not be approved, and that
may be inadequate under the standards set in the statute and regulations.”205 The legal impact of the Exeter decision, however, is unclear. Some courts have recognized its legal authority,206 while others
argue that the case does not apply to post-Boren Amendment rate
setting.207 Another court recognized the Exeter holding but found
that the courts are split on the issue.208
Arguably consistent with the holding in Exeter, CMS issued guidance in October that suggests that implementation is not permitted
prior to SPA approval.209 The letter to all State Medicaid Directors
(SMD) stated that “[f]ederal statute and regulations require CMS to
review and approve [plan amendments] . . . before a state may implement Medicaid program modifications.”210 At least one court,
203. Id. at 1108; see AGI-Bluff Manor, Inc. v. Reagen, 713 F. Supp. 1535, 1552
(W.D. Mo. 1989) (“The Medicaid Act and HHS regulations require that a state Medicaid plan or an amendment to the plan receive federal approval from [CMS] prior to
implementation.”).
204. Exeter Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 145 F.3d at 1108.
205. Id. at 1124 (quoting Exeter Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n v. Belshe, 943 F. Supp. 1239,
1243 (E.D. Cal. 1996)).
206. See Cal. Hosp. Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1136 (E.D. Cal.
2011) (“Any amendment to the State Plan, including changes in the methodology for
determining reimbursement rates, cannot be implemented until the amendment has
been approved by CMS.”).
207. See Appellants Joint Opening Brief, Cal. Ass’n of Health Facilities v. Douglas, No. 11-558851 (9th Cir. June 23, 2011), 2011 WL 2617609 at *10–*11.
208. Compare Cmty. Pharmacies of Ind. v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., No.
1:11-cv-0893-TWP-DKL, 2011 WL 4102804, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 14, 2011) (finding
that the Seventh Circuit has maintained the position that proposed amendments may
be implemented before approval is received), with Exeter Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 145
F.3d at 1108 (“[A]pproval is required before implementation of amendments to the
Plan.”).
209. See Letter from Cindy Mann, Director, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Services to State Medicaid Director & State Health Official 1 (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.
dmh.ca.gov/services_and_programs/medi_cal/docs/SMD10_020SPAReviewProcess.p
df.
210. Id. The letter also states that although “[i]n the past, the review process has
required that any issue identified during the review of SPA must be resolved . . . .
States will now have the option to resolve the issues related to State plan provisions
that are not integral to the SPA through a separate process.” Id. Cuts to reimburse-

BIENSTOCK_CHRISTENSEN

2012]

7/11/2012 8:21 AM

STATE MEDICAID PAYMENT POLICIES

837

however, refused to give this letter “considerable weight” in determining whether approval was required before states implement rate
reductions because “CMS has not exactly been a model of consistency
on this issue.”211 Additionally, the proposed rule, which was published after the SMD letter, contains no language even suggesting that
CMS requires approval prior to states’ implementation of rate cuts.
As CMS has failed to state explicitly whether prior approval is required, states have continued to implement rate reductions before
CMS review. For example, as noted above, California enacted212 and
implemented213 its 2008 and 2009 rate cuts before California even
submitted its SPA to CMS and continued even after HHS originally
disapproved them.214 California has specifically taken the position
ment rates, however, are integral to any SPA. The argument could also be made that
approval is required only when states are seeking to qualify for additional federal
funds. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 165.
211. Cmty. Pharmacies of Ind. v. Ind. Family & Social Servs. Admin., No. 1:11-cv0893-TWP-DKL, 2011 WL 4102804, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 14, 2011).
212. California’s Assembly Bill 5 was chaptered on Feb. 16, 2008. Assembly Bill
No. 5, 2007–2008 Leg., 3d Ex. Sess. (Cal. 2008), An act to amend Section 95004 of the
Government Code and to amend Sections 4640.6, 4643, 4648.4, 4681.3, 4681.5, 4691.6,
4781.6, and 4783 of, and to add Sections 4681.6, 4689.8, 4691.9, 14041.1, 14105.19, and
14166.245 to, the Welfare and Institutions Code, relating to health, and declaring the
urgency thereof, to take effect immediately.
213. California’s Assembly Bill 5 reduced provider reimbursement rates by 10%
“on and after July 1, 2008.” Id.
214. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 158, at 6 (Justice Kagan questioned whether California made an “end-run” around the administrative process by
putting “new rate schedules [] into effect even before [California] submitted them to
HHS, and continued them in effect while HHS was considering them, and continued
them in effect to the extent [California was] allowed to do so by injunction, even after
HHS disapproved them.”); see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); supra
notes 155–59 and accompanying text (explaining that California sought reconsideration of CMS’ disapproval, a hearing to reconsider was held on February 10, 2011, and
CMS ultimately approved California’s rate cuts on October 27, 2011). In light of
CMS’ approval of California’s rate cuts, the Supreme Court asked the parties in
Douglas to submit briefing on the effect of CMS’ action. See Douglas v. Indep. Living
Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 546, No. 09-958, 2012 WL 555204 (Feb. 22, 2012). In their
briefs, the Solicitor General and California Attorney General asked the Court to decide the case, see Letters from Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor Gen. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, and Karin S. Schwartz, Dep. Attorney Gen. Cal. Dep’t of Justice, to Hon.
William K. Suter, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court (Nov. 18, 2011), while the providers
and beneficiaries argued that the Court should dismiss certiorari as improvidently
granted based on the intervening events. See Letters from Carter G. Phillips, Sidley
Austin LLP, and Lynn S. Carmen to Hon. William K. Suter, Clerk, U.S. Supreme
Court (Nov. 18, 2011). More recently, the California Hospital Association (CHA)
petitioned a federal district court to grant a preliminary injunction against the California’s Medicaid program, to prevent it from making 10% reimbursement cuts primarily affecting hospital-based skilled nursing facilities. See Melanie Evans, Injunction Sought Against Calif. Medicaid Rate Cut, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Nov. 22,
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that the Exeter decision does not apply to post-Boren Amendment
rate setting and therefore it is free to go ahead and implement rate
reductions prior to CMS approval.215
The proposed rule fails to resolve this ambiguity. Many commentators argued that the final rule should state explicitly that CMS prohibits states from implementing any SPA that reduces or restructures
payment rates until CMS approval is obtained.216 Even if the final
rule, however, were to specify that CMS approval is required before
states may implement reimbursement rate cuts, there is limited action
that can be taken against states for non-compliance. The provisions
of the Medicaid Act that allow CMS to withhold some or all of a
state’s federal matching dollars if they are out of compliance are the
intended mechanism for holding states accountable for their Medicaid
obligations.217 Neither the proposed rule nor the current Medicaid
rules specify an alternative penalty and as discussed below, CMS almost never withholds federal matching funds.
B.

Compliance Action

To qualify for federal matching funds, a state plan must comply
with the requirements of the equal access provision.218 The Secretary
of HHS, through CMS, may withhold funding from a state where its
Medicaid payment policies do not so comply.219 In fact, some argue
that withholding federal funds is the only remedy available to CMS

2011), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20111122/NEWS/311229968/injunc
tion-sought-against-calif-rate-cuts. And on January 31, 2012, the U.S. District Court
Judge issued an injunction blocking the rate cuts, noting that the “state’s fiscal crisis
does not outweigh the serious irreparable injury plaintiffs would suffer absent the issuance of an injunction.” See Chris Megerian, Judge Issues Injunction Blocking
Healthcare Cuts; State to Appeal, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 1 2012), http://latimesblogs.la
times.com/california-politics/2012/02/california-budget-healthcare.html.
215. Appellants Joint Opening Brief, Cal. Ass’n of Health Facilities v. Douglas,
No. 11-558851, 2011 WL 2617609, at *10–*11 (9th Cir. June 23, 2011).
216. See Comment of National Health Law Program, at 3, in response to Medicaid
Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed. Reg.
26,342 (proposed May 6, 2011) (“CMS should amend the regulations to absolutely
clarify that SPAs that include rate reductions cannot be implemented until CMS has
an opportunity to review and make a decision. . . .”); Comment of Greater New York
Hospital Association, supra note 200, at 4 (“In the final rule, CMS should clearly
identify the consequences of non-compliance. At a minimum, we recommend that
CMS prohibit states from implementing any SPA that reduces or redistributes funding until CMS approval is obtained.”).
217. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
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for state violations of the Medicaid Act, including the equal access
provision.220 In a brief to the Supreme Court opposing certiorari in
the Douglas case, however, the United States argued that “programs
in which the drastic measure of withholding all or a major portion of
federal funding if the only available remedy would be generally less
effective than a system that also permits awards of injunctive relief in
private actions.”221 In other words, since withholding all or a major
portion of federal funding is an extreme and arguably draconian remedy,222 other remedies are necessary to complement and make meaningful CMS’ enforcement powers.
The United States reiterated this point in Planned Parenthood of

Indiana, Inc. v. Commissioner of Indiana State Department of
Health.223 The Indiana legislature passed legislation prohibiting providers that furnish abortion services from participating in the Medicaid program.224 This provision went into effect on May 10, 2011, and
Indiana subsequently submitted a SPA to CMS.225 CMS disapproved
the SPA on June 1, 2011, explaining that the CMS Administrator was
“unable to approve” the defunding provision amendment because the
Indiana law violated the Medicaid Act’s “freedom of choice”226 provision.227 Despite CMS’ disapproval, Indiana continued to enforce the
provision, and CMS did not withhold FFP from Indiana. Instead,
220. See, e.g., PhRMA v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 675 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (“I would reject petitioner’s statutory claim on the ground that the
remedy for the State’s failure to comply with the obligations it has agreed to undertake under the Medicaid Act is set forth in the Act itself: termination of funding by
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, see 42 U.S.C. §
1396c.”) (internal citations omitted).
221. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Maxwell-Jolly v. Indep. Living
Ctr. of S. Cal., 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2010) on petition for cert., 2010 WL 4959708, at
*19. Note that this statement is inconsistent with subsequent statements made by the
United States in the Douglas case after the Supreme Court granted certiorari. See
supra note 165 and accompanying text (noting that the United States opposed a
nonstatutory private right of action).
222. See, e.g., Consolidated Brief of American Medical Association et. al., Douglas
v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 546, No. 09-958, 2012 WL 555204 (Feb. 22,
2012), 2011 WL 3488986, at *5 (“Federal administrative enforcement provisions provide no viable solution to the access crisis because Congress delegated only limited,
and draconian, enforcement powers.”).
223. No. 1:11-CV-630, 2011 WL 2532921, at *10 (S.D. Ind. June 24, 2011).
224. IND. CODE § 5-22-17-5.5(b)–(d) (2011).
225. “On May 13, 2011, FSSA submitted a Medicaid plan amendment to account
for the defunding provision—to ‘make changes to Indiana’s State Plan in order to
conform to Indiana State Law.’” Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d at
905.
226. 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(23).
227. Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 905.
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CMS and the federal government supported Planned Parenthood’s
complaint, urging the federal district court to enjoin implementation
of the Indiana law, which violated the freedom of choice provision of
the Medicaid Act.228 According to the Statement of Interest Brief
submitted by the United States in this case, the request for “injunctive
relief [was] particularly necessary . . . [because] Indiana has expressed
its view that operating a ‘non-compliant program’ is a ‘lawful option
for the State under the [Medicaid] statute,’ so long as the State is willing to ‘risk that the Secretary will turn off the funding spigot.’”229 The
Court ultimately granted injunctive relief.
Planned Parenthood may be distinguished from Douglas because
the Indiana law was found to be in violation of the freedom of choice
provision of the Medicaid Act, not the equal access provision.230 The
United States’ reason, however, for supporting an alternative mechanism to enforce the Medicaid Act rather than withholding federal
funds in Planned Parenthood does not seem to turn on the specific
provision of the Medicaid Act, but rather the need for an effective response to a State’s operation of a non-compliant program.
Although the Supreme Court sent the Douglas case back to the
Ninth Circuit, the Court strongly suggested that the providers and
beneficiaries do not have a cause of action under the Supremacy
Clause.231 Instead, providers and beneficiaries must wait until final
agency action, which in the case of Douglas took more than 3 years,
and bring suit under the APA.232 Therefore, withholding all or a major portion of federal matching funds seems to be the most immediate

228. Statement of Interest of the United States at 1, Planned Parenthood of Ind.,
Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 892 (No. 11-CV-630) (explaining why injunctive relief is both
necessary and appropriate to prevent a state from continuing to violate the Medicaid
Act until HHS has the opportunity to formally reject a plan amendment).
229. Id. at 21–22.
230. See Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d at 905.
231. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text. In providing support for its
finding that there is no private right of action under the Supremacy Clause, the
Douglas dissent highlights the fact that the majority “provides a compelling list of
reasons” to decide that there is no cause of action directly under the Supremacy
Clause to enforce the equal access provision. Douglas, 132 S. Ct. 546, No. 09-958,
2012 WL 555204, at *10 (Feb. 22, 2012) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting).
The majority itself provides a compelling list of reasons for such a result:
“The Medicaid Act commits to the federal agency the power to administer a
federal program’; ‘the agency is comparatively expert in the statute’s subject
matter”; “the language of the particular provision at issue here is broad and
general, suggesting that the agency’s expertise is relevant”; and APA review
would provide “an authoritative judicial determination.” Id.
232. Id. at *5.
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penalty CMS may impose on states that fail to comply with the federal Medicaid law and regulations, and the only penalty so long as CMS
has failed to make a final decision. As noted above, however, CMS
rarely withholds federal funding because it would have perverse effects on the very people the remedy is intended to protect.233 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out during oral argument in the Douglas case,
loss of federal funds is “a very drastic remedy that is going to hurt the
people that Medicaid was meant to benefit.”234 Ultimately, the revocation of federal funding would likely result in even lower reimbursement rates, meaning that many Medicaid recipients may either
lose some of the services they currently receive or lose their coverage
altogether.235 In fact, the federal government has been candid about
its unwillingness to withhold federal funds because of the “potentially
detrimental effects” it would have on Medicaid recipients.236 A less
drastic and more targeted remedy is needed to penalize non-

233. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 52 (1981) (White
J., dissenting) (“[A] funds cutoff is a drastic remedy with injurious consequences to
the supposed beneficiaries of the Act.”); Mark H Gallant, Federal Remedies for
Noncompliance by States, 2 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE § 27:7 (2011) (describing the
suspension or reduction of payments to states as an “atomic bomb” remedy that is
rarely used by DHHS); Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault, supra note 92, at
2341 n.83 (noting that termination of federal funding “would have perverse effects if
CMS’s goal were to force state to provide more generous—rather than less generous—coverage; the withdrawal of federal funding would obviously harm the states’
capacity to be generous.”).
234. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 158, at 5.
235. See Brief of Respondents Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital et al., Douglas, 2012
WL 555204 (No. 09-958), 2011 WL 3288334, at *2 (“This draconian sanction is rarely
sought, however, because it would lead to a result that is contrary to the primary purpose of the Medicaid Act—i.e., to facilitate the provision of health care services to
those otherwise unable to obtain them.”).
236. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13 n.11, Exeter Mem. Hosp.
Ass’n v. Belshe, No. 96-693, 943 F. Supp. 1239 (E.D. Cal. 1996).
A compliance action, which results in the withholding of FFP, has a potentially detrimental effect on Medicaid recipients and providers. If [CMS]
were to withhold FFP pursuant to a compliance action, recipients may well
be deprived of medical assistance because the State may no longer be able
to provide certain services.
Id.; cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 165, at *31–*32 (“[I]f
the State plan does not comply with [Section (30)(A)], the Secretary can also undertake a compliance action and withhold federal funds. That administrative process
brings to bear ‘the expertise, uniformity, widespread consultation, and resulting administrative guidance that can accompany agency decisionmaking.’” (citing Gonzaga
Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 292 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment))).
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compliant states because withholding federal funds is a draconian enforcement mechanism that is hardly ever used.237
III. STRENGTHENING CMS’ OVERSIGHT OF STATES’ MEDICAID
PROVIDER PAYMENT RATES
As discussed above, the current administrative mechanisms for ensuring state compliance with the equal access provision are of limited
value. States do not wait for CMS approval before implementing rate
cuts; indeed, sometimes states do not even submit a SPA to CMS
when making a change to their payment policies. Although CMS has
the authority to withhold federal matching dollars when states are out
of compliance with the Medicaid Act or the equal access provision
specifically, they rarely do so, viewing it as a draconian remedy. And,
without the benefit of the administrative review of the proposed cut,
it is difficult for CMS to determine if a rate cut will in fact deny Medicaid beneficiaries equal access to care. The backup to the administrative enforcement has heretofore been the courts, with consumers and
providers seeking judicial review and injunctive relief of rate cuts they
believed violated the equal access provision. After the Supreme
Court’s decision in Douglas, that avenue is now in doubt.238
Congress, however, could write an explicit private cause of action
into the Medicaid Act.239 Some argue that a private right of action is
essential to ensure that states comply with Medicaid’s requirements.240 But others have argued that administrative enforcement
may work better than private litigation because a thorough understanding of Medicaid payment policies is needed to determine whether state rate cuts violate the equal access provision, and courts do not
have the expertise or resources to determine whether a given reimbursement rate reduction will cause Medicaid recipients to lose access
to needed services.241 Regardless of whether providers and benefi237. See Brief of Amici Curiae, AARP et al., 2012 WL 555204 (No. 09-958), 2011
WL 3584753, at *20 (“Termination of federal funding is a draconian remedy, one that
DHHS rarely uses.”).
238. See infra note 261 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., Guiltinan, supra note 119, at 1624; McKennan, supra note 149, at
503.
240. Mckennan, supra note 149, at 503–04 (“A private right action encourages provider participation by creating a mechanism to recoup financial damages incurred as
a result of accepting patients at below-cost rates. The private cause of action is a safety net for those contemplating participation in the [Medicaid] program.”).
241. See Jost, supra note 168, at 18 (arguing that the judiciary can make only a limited contribution to setting the rules for governing the health care industry or for resolving disputes that arise within it, leaving administrative oversight to carry out the-
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ciaries have standing to bring judicial action challenging state action,
an effective administrative remedy is needed to ensure expeditious
review of states’ Medicaid payment policies.
Although CMS has the authority to enforce federal standards
against states, it has failed for the most part to use this authority with
respect to the equal access provision. Part III proposes policies to
enhance the oversight of state payment policies and ensure compliance with the equal access provision. As a first step, CMS should
clarify that states must secure federal approval before making changes to provider payment policies. States that implement changes in
advance of federal approval should be held accountable if their rate
cuts are ultimately found to violate the equal access provision. Second, CMS could provide that where states benchmark their Medicaid rate levels to Medicare rate levels, CMS would presume the
states’ reimbursement rates to be consistent with the equal access
provision without prior review.
A. Require and Enforce Prior Approval of Medicaid Rate Cuts
CMS should amend the Medicaid regulations to explicitly require
CMS approval before implementation of rate cuts.242 As discussed
above, CMS’ proposed rule sets forth a framework by which states
can demonstrate compliance with the equal access provision.243 The
proposed rule requires that any SPA “that [would] reduce provider
payment rates or restructure provider payments in circumstance[s]
when the resulting changes could create access issues” must include
an access review that is conducted prior to the submission of a SPA
implementing a rate reduction.244 The proposed rule does not specify
the consequences of failing to submit a SPA or implementing a rate
reduction prior to CMS approval of the SPA. CMS’ final rule should
clarify that any rate cut or reduction must be accompanied by an acse tasks); Moncrieff, The Supreme Court’s Assault, supra note 92, at 2324 (suggesting
that a shift of regulatory authority from judicial forums to federal executive forums
may be good for health care).
242. See CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, supra note 181, at 12 (suggesting that Congress “could require that HHS make specific findings of fact regarding
the effects of rates on access because a state may be permitted either to increase or
reduce provide payment rates”).
243. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26344 (May 6, 2011) (“[W]e are proposing federal guidelines to frame alternative approaches for States to demonstrate consistency with the
access requirement using a standardized, transparent process, rather than setting nationwide standards.”).
244. Id. at 26349.
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cess review.245 Further, CMS should make clear that states may not
implement provider reimbursement rate cuts until they have complied with the access framework in the rule and received CMS approval.246
If a state implements rate cuts in advance of federal approval, it
should be held accountable if CMS ultimately denies the rate cut
SPA. Specifically, federal funding must be withheld if CMS bars the
rate cut barred. Unlike the current system, which gives the federal
government discretion to withhold all or some federal funding after a
state has failed to comply with federal requirements, this rule would
impose a mandatory and discrete penalty on states that implement
rate cuts without CMS approval.
For whatever reason, if states go ahead and implement rate cuts
before receiving CMS approval, they should be penalized if CMS
thereafter denies their SPA cutting reimbursement rates. CMS
should amend the Medicaid regulations to include a provision that if
states implement rate cuts prior to receiving CMS approval, states
risk the loss of FFP for any retroactive payments that they are found
to owe providers for the time that the disapproved rate cuts were in
effect. This penalty imposes a risk that is comparable to the risk
states face if they implement rate increases prior to receiving CMS
approval. If a state increases provider rates prior to CMS approval,
and CMS subsequently disapproves the rate increase, the state will be
liable for the full cost of the increased payment. This scenario rarely
occurs, however, because states are unwilling to risk the loss of FFP
for payment increases and therefore wait for federal approval of rate
increases. By contrast, the current system does not put states at risk
of losing FFP if they implement rate cuts before receiving CMS approval. Therefore, this new rule would discourage states from implementing rate cuts before receiving CMS approval, as they would
be liable for 100% of the retroactive reimbursement if CMS ultimately disapproves the rate reduction.
For example, hypothetical State A passed legislation that reduced
hospital provider rates by 10%. State A implemented the legislation
on July 1, 2010. Two months later,247 on September 1, 2010, State A
245. Id.
246. Letter from Rick Pollack, Executive Vice President, American Hospital
Assoc., to Donald Berwick, Admin., Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(June 30, 2011).
247. Although regulations require that, when making changes to “advance directive requirements,” amendments must be submitted no later than sixty days from
the effective date, the regulations do not specify a specific time when all other
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submitted a SPA to CMS seeking approval for the reduction in hospital provider rate cuts. Under Medicaid regulations, CMS has ninety
days to render a decision on State A’s SPA. But CMS requested additional information from State A regarding the proposed rate reductions and State A provided CMS with the additional information on
December 1, 2010. CMS notified State A that the SPA had been disapproved on February 1, 2011 and State A immediately sought reconsideration of the disapproval. A hearing to reconsider the disapproval of State A’s SPA was scheduled for April 1, 2011 and the
disapproval was affirmed on September 1, 2011.
For fourteen months, from July 1, 2010 until September 1, 2011,
State A had implemented a 10% rate reduction despite the fact that
CMS never approved their SPA. Prior to this reduction State A paid
approximately $200 million a month for hospital payments.248 With a
10% reduction, State A paid approximately $20 million less than it
had previously paid. This decrease in payment persisted for fourteen
months before CMS finally affirmed its decision to disapprove State
A’s SPA. State A now must reimburse the hospital providers for the
reduction over the last fourteen months—approximately $280 million. State A normally would have received federal matching funds
for this payment; however, based on the penalty proposed, State A
would be required to pay this amount in full. State A’s FMAP is
57%, the national average.249 That is, State A would have received
approximately $160 million from the federal government for this hospital payment, but due to its implementation of the payment reduction prior to receiving CMS approval, under the proposed approach,
State A would not receive the $160 million in matching funds from
the federal government.

amendments must be submitted. 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(1)(ii). Instead, the regulations
state “prompt submittal of amendments is necessary (i) so that CMS can determine
whether the plan continues to meet the requirements for approval and (ii) to ensure
that availability of FFP in accordance with § 430.20.” 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(2)(i)–(ii).
248. Although this example is purely hypothetical, these numbers are not unreasonable. For example, in 2007, Pennsylvania spent approximately $12 billion on
Medicaid. About 18.5% of Pennsylvania’s Medicaid spending was on hospital payments. That is, Pennsylvania spent approximately $226 million on hospital payments
per month in 2009. See TOTAL MEDICAID SPENDING, THE URBAN INSTITUTE &
KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED (2010). View interactive
table at statehealthfacts.org.
249. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting that the average FMAP for
states is 55%).
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States are already struggling to find the state funds to reimburse
providers.250 Losing tens of millions of dollars for failing to follow
federal regulations should be more than sufficient to incentivize states
to follow the administrative procedures when enacting significant rate
reductions. This Note previously acknowledged the detrimental effects that withholding federal funds could have on providers and
Medicaid beneficiaries. But, unlike the current system, where the
threat is both too great and too amorphous, under this proposal the
penalty is mandatory and the amount is limited.
Finally, a requirement of prior approval imposes an obligation on
CMS to review proposed rate cuts expeditiously. Assuming that CMS
enacts a final rule, expeditious review should be possible since CMS
has provided states with a “standardized, transparent process” to set
reimbursement rates in compliance with the equal access provision.251
In fact, the proposed rule recognizes that CMS has the regulatory authority “to make SPA decisions based on sufficiency of beneficiary
service access” and that “this proposed rule merely provides a more
consistent and transparent way to gather and analyze the necessary
information to support such reviews.”252 If this new rule, in fact, provides states with a process for determining access, then CMS should
be able to make determinations on state SPAs that cut reimbursement rates rather expeditiously and states should not have to wait
months (or years) for CMS to make a determination on their rate
cuts.
B.

Benchmark Medicaid Rates to Medicare

An alternate approach by which states could comply with the equal
access provision would be to benchmark Medicaid rates to Medicare
rate levels.253 This option would relieve states of the obligation to
conduct an access review and enable the expeditious implementation
of rate cuts.
In opposing CMS’ proposed rule, many states have argued that the
access review process proposed by CMS imposes “extremely burden-

250. See, e.g., Melissa Westphal, Illinois Has Area Hospitals Playing ‘Balancing
Game’ with Late Money, ROCKFORD REGISTER STAR (Oct. 22, 2011), http://www.
rrstar.com/news/x1872805880/Illinois-has-area-hospitals-playing-balancing-game (“Illinois is far behind in paying bills owed to health care providers.”).
251. Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26344 (May 6, 2011).
252. Id.
253. Mckennan, supra note 149, at 505.
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some . . . data collection obligations on states as a precondition to
demonstrating compliance with the vague rate-setting standards.”254
The States argue that the effort to conduct a study like the access
study required in the proposed rule “would be nothing short of Herculean.”255 The states also contend that the requirements under the
proposed rule “would leave states in a state of perpetual uncertainty .
. . of their provider reimbursement rates.”256 Allowing states to set
their Medicaid rates based on federal standards would relieve states
of the responsibility to conduct a costly access study, and would provide states with the certainty that their rates are compliant with federal requirements.
Linking Medicaid rates to Medicare rates is not a radical solution
to the problem of unreasonably low Medicaid rates. As discussed
above, based on Section (30)(A)’s requirement that state payment
policies are consistent with efficiency and economy, states cannot set
reimbursement rates that exceed the UPL.257 “[The] UPL [is] calculated based on what could reasonably be estimated would . . . be paid
under Medicare payment principles to an entire class of providers.”258
In addition, the ACA includes a provision, often referred to as the
“PCP bump,” which requires state Medicaid agencies to increase primary care provider (PCP) reimbursement rates to reach parity with
Medicare rates in 2013 and 2014.259 By benchmarking Medicaid rates
to Medicare, the PCP bump “enables Medicaid programs to sustain
and potentially expand its primary care network . . . and creates a critical opportunity to drive improvements in primary care access and
quality.”260
Similar to the UPL and the ACA’s PCP bump provision, states
may opt-in to set rates based on federal standards benchmarked at
Medicare rates. By giving states this option, states can decide to retain flexibility in designing payment methodologies or decide to set
rates based on federal standards. This alternative option would allow
states to avoid penalties for setting rates not in compliance with fed-

254. Joint Comments of 17 States and State Medicaid Agencies at 2 (July 5, 2011),
in response to Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,342 (May 6, 2011).
255. Id. at 3.
256. Id. at 4.
257. See BACHRACH, supra note 114, at 7 and accompanying text.
258. See SCHNEIDER & ROUSSEAU, supra note 115 and accompanying text.
259. See MCGINNIS, BERENSON & HIGHSMITH, supra note 93, at 1.
260. See id. at 2.
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eral rules and relieve states having to comply with the “burdensome”
access review process.261
CONCLUSION
The Medicaid law vests CMS with the responsibility and authority
to review state payment policies to ensure compliance with the equal
access provision; it also establishes a SPA review process to effectuate
CMS oversight of state Medicaid programs. Due both to the lack of
financial incentives for states to comply with the SPA process and the
perverse effects of a federal compliance action—withholding federal
matching dollars—the federal government lacks effective tools to ensure compliance with the equal access provision. In short, the current
administrative remedies for non-compliance are without teeth. This
Note proposes two approaches whereby CMS could facilitate state
compliance with the equal access provision and penalize noncompliance. States that implement changes in advance of federal
SPA approval would be held accountable if their rate cuts are ultimately found to violate the equal access provision. In addition, states
that benchmark their Medicaid rate levels to Medicare rates would be
presumed to be in compliance with the equal access provision. These
policy changes will not only streamline the state rate-setting process,
but will also give the federal government the tools to provide effective oversight of state payment policies.
Enforcement of the equal access provision is central to Medicaid’s
goal of providing low-income Americans with meaningful access to
needed medical care. Tens of millions of people rely on Medicaid for
their health insurance. Without access to services that coverage is
meaningless. If states are permitted to disregard the equal access
provision with impunity, not only will violations of federal law go unchecked, but millions of Americans will be without adequate access to
needed medical services. The lack of access puts them at unnecessary
risk of harm or even death. For all these reasons, CMS must adopt
procedures to ensure that state Medicaid payment policies enable
Medicaid beneficiaries to access medical services to the same extent
as the general population in their communities.

261. See Joint Comments of 17 States and State Medicaid Agencies, supra note
254, at 2. (“[T]he Commenting States are deeply concerned that the access review
process proposed by CMS fails to advance those objectives, instead subjecting states
to unnecessarily burdensome requirements . . . .”).

